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The Challenges Posed by
Demographic Change in
sub-Saharan Africa: A
Concise Overview
JOHN CLELAND
KAZUYO MACHIYAMA
In the early years of the twenty-first century, economic growth in sub-
Saharan Africa (henceforth Africa) was buoyant, with annual real GDP
growth of close to 7 percent. The collapse of commodity prices and the
slowdown in global economic growth have since adversely affected Africa’s
short-term prospects. Growth in 2015 and 2016 is expected to be about
3 percent, down from earlier years but still higher than in most other re-
gions (IMF 2016). Our purpose is to outline the challenges that demographic
change poses over the next 35 years, challenges that will need to be over-
come or circumvented if countries in this region are to make rapid social
and economic progress. The stakes are undoubtedly high. In 1950 the pop-
ulation of Africa comprised about 7 percent of the global total. By 2050, the
equivalent proportion will be around 22 percent (UN Population Division
2015). What happens in Africa between now and mid-century will have
both regional and global implications.
We take a cautious approach to our assessment of the region’s future
prospects given the wide diversity of the region. It contains 42 mainland
nation states (plus ninemostly very small island nations) with very different
economies, ethnic compositions, natural resources, climates, and political
systems. No doubt, the future for some will be bright but not for others. To
present a regional overview, we ignore much of this national variability of
circumstances. However, the central forces of demographic change will be
broadly similar across the majority of countries, and this similarity provides
a justification for the regional perspective offered here. Moreover, poverty
characterizes the majority of countries. Out of the 42 mainland states, 30
are classified as being “least developed” compared with only 14 similarly
classified from all other world regions.
We start with a brief summary of projected population change be-
tween 2015 and 2050. Projections exist beyond the mid-century point
but the range of possibilities becomes very wide and increasingly specula-
tive. For these reasons, long-term scenarios will not be discussed. We then
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TABLE 1 Sub-Saharan African demographic changes (2015–2050)
Population size
(millions)
Percent
distribution
Age group/
indicator 2015 2050
Absolute
change
2015–2050
Percent
change
2015–2050 2015 2050
0–4 157 251 93 59 16 12
5–19 359 668 309 86 37 31
20–64 416 1,100 684 164 43 52
65+ 30 104 75 251 3 5
Total 962 2,123 1,161 121 100 100
Urban 360 1,137 782 215 37 55
Rural 590 938 344 58 63 45
Births 35 53 17 49 — —
Growth
rate (%)
2.71 1.90 — — — —
Dependency
ratio
86 62 –24 –28 — —
SOURCE: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015). World
Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, DVD Edition.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2014). World Urbanization
Prospects: The 2014 Revision, CD-ROM Edition.
examine the challenges under the following headings: pressure on health
and education provision; food security and agriculture; urban living condi-
tions; employment and livelihoods; and intra-regional migration.
Demographic change, 2015–2050
Table 1 presents the key demographic changes between 2015 and 2050.
They are based on the medium projection of the 2015 World Population
Prospects and the 2014 revision ofWorld Urbanization Prospects, both produced
by the United Nations Population Division (UN Population Division 2014,
2015). At a regional level and over a period of a few decades, the UN projec-
tions have a good track record of predictive validity (Bongaarts and Bulatao
2000). Thus there is no reason to believe that the projections for Africa
up to mid-century are seriously misleading, though the figures for specific
countries will be subject to greater error.
The dominant feature of Table 1 is one of continued growth, albeit at
uneven paces across age groups and urban–rural strata. Total population is
expected to more than double in size. Figure 1 shows the degree of inter-
country variability. Niger stands out as having by far the greatest expected
proportionate increase in population, though, as discussed below, this out-
come is highly improbable. Other countries with projected increases ex-
ceeding 150 percent are Zambia, Angola, Uganda, Mali, Tanzania, Burundi,
and Democratic Republic of Congo. At the other end of the spectrum are
the countries of Southern Africa with increases of less than 50 percent. The
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FIGURE 1 Percent increase in population between 2015
and 2050 in sub-Saharan Africa
arguments in this article are much less relevant to Southern Africa than to
other sub-regions.
Despite fertility decline, the expected number of births per year in the
region will rise by 49 percent, from around 35 million in 2015, to 53 million
in 2050, and the relative increase of infants and young children will be
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somewhat larger. The number of children of primary and secondary school
age, 5–19 years, will increase from 359 to 668 million, a rise of close to 90
percent. Men and women in the prime productive ages of 20–64 years will
increase at a faster pace. The potential work force will be 2.6 times larger
in 2050 than in 2015. The largest proportionate increase will occur among
those aged 65 years or older, though this increase in absolute numbers is
modest.
The single most significant expected change in population structure
over these 35 years will be the urban–rural balance. The urban population
is expected to expand three-fold from 360 million to 1,137 million, while
the rural population will grow by a more modest 58 percent. In 2015, urban
inhabitants comprised 37 percent of the total, and by 2050 this will have in-
creased to 55 percent. The changes in age structure will be less pronounced.
The population aged under 20 years will shrink from 53 to 43 percent, the
over-65s will grow from 3 to 5 percent, and the share in the prime working
ages will expand from 43 to 52 percent.
These changes in age structure are classically represented by the total
dependency ratio, the number of those aged less than 15 or over 64 per
hundred aged 15–64. Over the next 35 years this ratio will fall from 86 to
62, a drop of 28 percent. To put this change into global perspective, Figure 2
shows long-term trends in the dependency ratio for Africa compared with
trends in other regions. It is immediately apparent that the fall in the ratio
has been, and will continue to be, slower in Africa than elsewhere in the
developing world and the ratio will remain higher for the next 35 years.
Expectations have been raised about the prospect of accelerated eco-
nomic growth in Africa that may arise from falling fertility and declining de-
pendency ratios, though such growth is contingent on other factors, notably
appropriate policies. Other chapters in this volume address the prospects of
a demographic dividend in Africa but there are at least three reasons for
caution.
First, as shown above, the change in age structure is slow and thus it is
unlikely that the demographic stimulus by itself will be sufficiently sharp to
provoke rapid socioeconomic progress. Indeed, modeling by a World Bank
team estimates only a modest boost to income per head resulting from faster
growth in the labor force than in the entire population and from increased
savings and investment. Between 2011 and 2030, the effect is estimated to
be an increase of 0.4 percentage points in the real GDP per capita growth
rate for the region as a whole (Ahmed et al. 2014). A similarly modest effect
of an exogenous decline in the total fertility rate of 0.5 births perwomanwas
estimated for Nigeria (Ashraf, Weil, and Wilde 2013). After 20 years, GDP
per head would be higher by 5.6 percent, increasing to nearly 12 percent
higher after 50 years. Over the 50-year period, the rate of growth in GDP
per head would be raised by only 0.2 percent. Larger effects are found in the
simulation model of Karra, Canning, and Wilde (in this volume). However,
JOHN CLELAND / KAZUYO MACH IYAMA 5
FIGURE 2 Total dependency ratio, selected regions, 1950–2050
given the limited understanding of the mix of factors that drive economic
growth and the unpredictability of global trends and policy directions, the
results of all economic models of this type must be regarded as illustrative
possibilities rather than predictions.
The second reason for caution originates in the simplifying dichotomy,
assumed in most economic modeling of the demographic dividend, be-
tween a working population aged 15–64 and a dependent population
outside these age limits. Labor force surveys show that the real situation is
more complex and boundaries are blurred. For instance, the 2013 Ethiopian
Labor Force Survey shows that, in rural areas, 64 percent of 10–14-year-
olds were economically active and worked on average for 28 hours in the
past week (Ethiopia, Central Statistical Agency 2014). The corresponding
figures for those aged 20–64 were 89 percent and 34 hours. So the expected
difference is present but it is not large, though, of course, children are not as
productive as adults. In urban Ethiopia, by contrast, only 21 and 42 percent
6 CHALLENGES POSED BY DEMOGRAPH IC CHANGE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFR ICA
of the population aged 10–14 and 15–19, respectively, are economically
active compared with 81 percent of those aged 20–64 years, a reflection
no doubt of greater urban than rural school participation and diminished
opportunities for urban children to contribute to domestic enterprises.
These Ethiopian data suggest that, as urbanization and secondary schooling
increase in Africa, the direct contribution to GDP of 15–19-year-olds will
diminish, thereby diluting the immediate advantage of changes in age
structure.
A third reason for caution concerns the productive potential of
women, who, as family sizes fall, have greater opportunities to seek employ-
ment. This link between demographic change and production by women
may be an important ingredient of the demographic bonus for Asia but is
less plausible for Africa. Again the Ethiopian labor force survey is revealing.
It shows that economic activity and hours worked among women are just
as high in the peak reproductive ages of 20–29 as at other ages. This result is
consistent with abundant research showing that production and reproduc-
tion are compatible in the largely agricultural and family-based economies
of Africa. Moreover, an analysis of the work–fertility relationship showed
no link between declining fertility in Africa from the early 1990s to 2005
and increased employment of women (Baschieri et al. 2009).
The preceding caveats are not intended to deny the advantages of
declining fertility and changing age structure but rather to warn against
naively optimistic expectations. However modest the short-term gains of
declining fertility may be, continuation of current fertility levels, in the ab-
sence of amortality resurgence, would result in an implausibly large end-of-
century population in Africa of 14.7 billion (UN Population Division 2015).
Continued fertility declines in this region are indispensable for a sustainable
future, and faster declines would be more beneficial than slower ones.
Population pressure on human capital
formation
It is widely held that improvement of human capital, notably health
and education, is the key to social and economic progress. The impor-
tance of education has been demonstrated most recently by Lutz and col-
leagues (Lutz, Butz, and KC 2014; Cuaresma, Lutz, and Sanderson 2014).
African countries have achieved marked improvements in primary school
enrollments (UNESCO 2011). Between 1999 and 2009, net primary enroll-
ment rose from below 60 percent to close to 75 percent and the gap between
Africa and other regions narrowed (see Figure 3). In 2011, there were an
estimated 3.2 million primary school teachers in Africa. To achieve univer-
sal primary schooling and educate increased numbers of children, set to rise
by 9.5 million between 2011 and 2030, an extra 2.1 million teachers will
be needed (UNESCO 2013).
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FIGURE 3 Adjusted net enrollment rate for primary
education, selected regions, 1999–2012
Improvements have also been recorded in secondary school enroll-
ments, but on this dimension Africa lags well behind other regions and
the gap is not narrowing (see Figure 4). Because of growing numbers
graduating from primary schools, demand for secondary school places is
increasing rapidly. Secondary schooling is more expensive than primary
schooling and the budget allocations of many governments are insufficient
to meet demand, with the consequence that attendance requires financial
contributions from families. UNESCO (2013) estimates that the number of
secondary school teachers will have to rise from one million in 2011 to 3.5
million by 2030 to achieve universal lower secondary education. To close
the gap with other regions, particularly in secondary schooling, will thus
require a major increase in expenditure on school buildings and teachers.
Population growth will make the task more formidable. The school-age
population (broadly 5–19 years) in Africa will increase by 8.8 million, or
2.5 percent, each year on average between 2015 and 2050.
Pursuit of enrollment targets may further erode the quality of school-
ing. In 2007, 18 percent of grade 6 students, on average, were rated illit-
erate in 14 East and Southern African countries with a range of 1.4 per-
cent in Swaziland to 44 percent in Zambia (Hungi et al. 2010). Innumeracy
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FIGURE 4 Net enrollment rate for secondary education,
selected regions, 1999–2013
was worse with an average of 31 percent rated innumerate. Poor cogni-
tive progress among students is a greater source of illiteracy and innumer-
acy than failure to reach grade 6 (Spaull and Taylor 2015). As shown by
the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), over
three-quarters of eighth- and ninth-graders in South Africa and Ghana did
not surpass the lowest measure of proficiency in mathematics, compared
with an international mean of 25 percent (Filmer and Fox 2014). Quality
of teaching will be important but is jeopardized by the large increase in the
school-aged populations.
Similar considerations apply to health. The maternal mortality ratio
in Africa is estimated to be 510 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2013, far
higher than in any other developing region. Skilled attendance at delivery
is the key remedy and progress has been slow. The proportion of attended
births rose from 40 percent in 1990 to 53 percent in 2012 (UN Statistical
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Office 2014). Most African countries are not training enough physicians,
nurses, and midwives. A detailed examination of 12 countries found that
six were not training sufficient health staff in all three categories tomaintain
existing absolute numbers, and only three were training sufficient nurses
and midwives to replace those leaving the labor force. Four countries were
on track to increase numbers but not sufficiently to match population in-
crease. Only two countries were likely to improve the ratio of staff to popu-
lation (Kinfu et al. 2009). Inevitably, the steady increase in number of births,
from 35 to 53 million per year over the next 35 years, will be an obstacle to
maternal health improvements. Similarly, the 59 percent projected increase
in the number of infants and young children will impose a strain on health
budgets and staff. It is estimated that the health work force would need to
increase by 10 percent per year to meet demand for health care between
now and 2030, a rate of growth far higher than in other developing regions
(WHO 2015).
Of course, population increase does not make rapid improvements in
human capital formation impossible but it does imply diversion of funds,
by governments and by families, away from investments in the moderniza-
tion of agriculture or industrialization, as argued decades ago by Coale and
Hoover (1958).
Food security, agriculture, and climate change
Despite increased global consumption of meat and dairy products, driven by
affluence, four crops account for 65 percent of world food intake: wheat,
maize, rice, and potatoes. For much of the past century international prices
for these staples have remained stable or have even fallen. Since 2002, how-
ever, prices have risen and become more volatile, partly because of crop
failures in major producing areas and the diversion of land to biofuel pro-
duction. These developments are seen by many experts as a signal of a new
era of uncertainty in meeting demand for food (von Braun 2007; Godfray
et al. 2010). This demand, set to increase by 70 to 100 percent between
2010 and 2050, is the result of population growth and change in diets. In a
seminal paper, the joint challenges of eliminating hunger and meeting de-
mand in an environmentally sustainable way were described as creating a
“perfect storm” (Godfray et al. 2010).
These global considerations matter for Africa both because the conti-
nent has been importing increasing amounts of food and under-nutrition
remains widespread. Since the 1970s Africa has been a net importer of
food; between 1980 and 2007, net imports in real terms grew at 3.4 per-
cent per year (Rakotoarisoa, Iafrate, and Paschali 2011). Population growth,
and changing dietary preferences among urban populations, rather than in-
creased consumption per head, account for most of this trend. While richer
African countries, such as Botswana and Gabon, import more per head of
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FIGURE 5 Prevalence of undernourishment, by region, 1990–92
and 2011–2013 (%)
population than poor countries, all but a handful of poor African countries
are net importers. On average, 31 percent of cereals consumed in 2008 were
imported (African Development Bank Group 2009). Recent estimates of the
total value of food imports range between US$30 billion and US$50 billion
per year.
Increased food imports coexist with widespread under-nutrition.
While there has been modest improvement since the early 1990s, an esti-
mated 25 percent of Africa’s population was undernourished in 2011–13,
higher than in any other developing region (FAO 2013). Most countries
with alarming measures on the global hunger index are in Africa (IF-
PRI 2014). As shown in Figure 5, nutritional gains have been greater in
Southern, South-Eastern, and Eastern Asia than in Africa.
Although under-nourishment in the general population and stunting
in children are not always closely related, the two indicators give a similar
impression. In South-Central Asia, stunting prevalence fell from 61 percent
in 1990 to 36 percent in 2010. By contrast, prevalence remained unchanged
over this period at 38 percent in Western Africa, and fell from 48 to 45
percent in Eastern Africa and from 45 to 39 percent in Middle Africa (de
Onis, Blossner, and Borghi 2012).
JOHN CLELAND / KAZUYO MACH IYAMA 11
Africa is a predominantly rural, agricultural continent, with about two-
thirds of employment derived from agriculture. Yet dependence on food im-
ports has increased and hunger remains widespread. Whereas most Asian
countries benefited from the Green Revolution that transformed agricul-
tural yields, no such leap forward occurred in Africa; yields per hectare
have remained static and domestic production has barely kept pace with
population increase by extending cropland. Between 1985 and 2005, ce-
real production grew by 65 percent but population increased by 71 percent
(Jayne et al. 2010). Little research has been done on genetic improvement
of some key African crops, such as sorghum, millet, and teff. Use of fertiliz-
ers, irrigation, and mechanization is extremely low. Rural infrastructure is
poor and thus marketing of surplus production is difficult. Access to credit
for farmers has been very limited. Only in the last decade has the serious
neglect of agriculture in development policies been acknowledged (World
Bank 2007).
With Africa now facing a further doubling of population in the next 35
years, food availability will have to increase to a similar degree just to main-
tain existing nutritional standards and by more if hunger is to be reduced.
Although food availability does not guarantee reduced hunger, particularly
in the urban population where affordability is crucial, it is an essential pre-
condition. And while the nutritional needs of growing populations do not
necessarily have to be met by domestic production, the costs of escalating
food imports would be a severe and probably unsustainable burden on all
but the few wealthier countries.
The big question therefore is whether agricultural production in Africa
can more than double between now and mid-century. Baseline yields are
so low that reducing the barriers mentioned above provides a potential for
rapid improvements. Taking into account availability of virgin land and as-
suming a doubling of yields, Alexandratos (2005) calculated that the major-
ity of 11 African countries with particularly high population growth could
increase cereal production per head by 2050. However, three major and less
tractable obstacles to progress can be identified.
First, the rural population will continue to increase, leading to further
declines in arable land per farmer in countries lacking virgin land that
can be brought under cultivation. Soil in much of Africa has a bedrock of
granite and gneiss and low inherent fertility. Its low clay content makes
it susceptible to water and wind erosion. About two-thirds of arable
land suffers from degradation and lowered soil fertility, and increased
production depends on organic or mineral additions (Montpellier Panel
2014). Population pressure poses an obvious risk of over-cropping and
over-grazing of fragile ecosystems, leading to further soil degradation and
erosion.
Second, about 95 percent of African agriculture is rainfed and thus ex-
tremely vulnerable to climate change. Little is known about the nature and
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threats of future climate change in sub-regions of Africa, but the strongest
prediction of climate scientists is that extreme weather events, including
droughts and floods, will become more frequent (Conway 2009). Better
water capture and storage are essential but the scale of needed investment
is daunting, and, at least in the short term, vulnerability to erratic rainfall
will persist. In addition, many crops in Africa are grown close to their lim-
its of thermal tolerance. Most estimates of the effects of temperature rise
predict serious losses in production. One such study anticipates losses by
mid-century of 22, 17, 17, 18, and 8 percent for maize, sorghum, millet,
groundnut, and cassava (Schlenker and Lobell 2010).
Third, farm sizes are small and security of tenure often lacking. Av-
erage farm size in Africa is 1.8 hectares and falling (World Bank 2012). In
six countries of East and Southern Africa, the ratio of cultivated land to
the agricultural population has halved since the 1960s. In Kenya, Zambia,
Malawi, and Mozambique, at least 25 percent of smallholder farms control
less than half a hectare and are thus approaching landlessness (Jayne et al.
2010). The situation is even more acute in Rwanda and Ethiopia. Small
farms tend to have higher yields per hectare but lower productivity per
worker than large units. In many settings, small units are insufficient for
subsistence, let alone the production of a surplus for sale, and economies
of scale, such as attained through mechanization, are difficult to achieve.
Using survey data from five East and Southern African countries, Jayne,
Mather, andMghenyi (2010) calculate that about half of small-scale farmers
have no surplus staple grain to sell but rather have to buy. Moreover, small
family farmers have no cushion against adversity and cannot afford the
risk of innovation. Small farmers will increasingly have to rely on off-farm
income or turn to high-value crops, such as fruit and vegetables. Collier
and Dercon (2014) argue that the conventional emphasis on smallholder
farms as the key to poverty reduction and increased output, epitomized
by the World Bank’s 2008 World Development Report, may be misguided
because larger commercial farms have critical advantages in terms of
access to new technologies and finance and in trading, marketing, and
storage.
A related concern is insecurity of ownership or tenure. It is esti-
mated that ownership of only 10 percent of land is registered, leaving
many farmers open to land expropriation and abuse by corrupt officials
(Byamugisha 2013). Moreover, insecurity of tenure acts as a disincentive
to investments for the long term, such as terracing or tree planting. In
Ethiopia and Rwanda land registration programs that gave farmers greater
security had significant impacts on willingness to invest in soil and water
improvements, thereby raising productivity, though no similar gains were
found in Zambia (Byamugisha 2013; Sitko, Chamberlin, and Hichaambwa
2014).
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Rapid urbanization without industrialization
Urbanization is an integral part of economic modernization and typically
characterized as a structural shift from low-productivity agricultural work
to higher-productivity activities in manufacturing and services. Some com-
mentators have argued that Africa would benefit from higher rates of
rural-to-urban migration (De Brauw, Mueller, and Lee 2014). Similarly,
cities are often the engine of economic growth and innovation (Glaeser
2011), though it is doubtful whether this characterization applies in Africa,
where urbanization is occurring in the absence of major industrialization.
Large and growing concentrations of young people willing to work at low
(by international standards) wages could act a magnet for foreign capital
investment.
Whether or not this optimism is justified, the dismal living conditions
of the majority of Africa’s urban inhabitants are well documented and have
been slow to improve. The proportion of the urban population using an
improved sanitation facility has remained unchanged since 1990 at 41 per-
cent. Similarly, the proportion living in slums has fallen only slightly from
70 percent in 1990 to 62 percent in 2012, where slums are defined by lack
of at least one of the following conditions: access to safe water and improved
sanitation, a dwelling made of durable materials, and two or fewer persons
per room (UN Statistical Office 2014). By comparison, the proportion of the
urban population living in slums is 35 percent in Southern Asia and 33 per-
cent for all developing regions. The gap between Africa and elsewhere is
stark.
A detailed account of factors that have contributed to this state of af-
fairs is given by Collier and Venables (2013). They include: the high cost of
raw materials for dwelling construction; lack of skilled construction work-
ers; confused legal ownership of urban and peri-urban land; lack of ap-
propriate credit institutions; and reluctance of political elites to encourage
rural-to-urban migration by investing in infrastructure and low-cost hous-
ing. As a result, the typical urban dweller lives in a shack in a shantytown
without roads, electricity, or sewerage. The dwelling is either rented from
a slum landlord or self-built and self-financed. Collier and Venables argue
that the failure to create a formal and regulated urban housing market
in Africa is a significant missed opportunity. Elsewhere, the era of rapid
urbanization has generated high levels of employment for both unskilled
and skilled workers in the building of affordable houses.
Thanks to the surveillance system of the African Population and Health
Research Centre in two Nairobi slums, more is known about slum dwellers
in this city than elsewhere in Africa. Most inhabitants were born in ru-
ral areas and came to Nairobi because of limited rural opportunities (Zulu
et al. 2011). A minority are long-term residents who have flourished, sav-
ing enough for education of children and investing in rural homesteads.
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For the majority, spatial mobility is very high and life precarious. Half of
all households are classified as food insecure. Injuries make a large contri-
bution to overall mortality and morbidity and half of these are intentional.
Road traffic accidents are the next largest contributor to this cause of death.
Africa’s urban population is projected to grow at about 3.5 percent
per year for the next 20 years, a rate of increase that implies a doubling
in size every 20 years. The population pressure on urban housing, environ-
ment, and infrastructure will be relentless. In the absence of rapid economic
growth and radical changes in policy priorities and urban governance, the
prospect is one of continued large increases in the number of Africans who
live in urban localities that lack most basic amenities and have high levels of
violence and insecurity. The threat to social cohesion of increasing numbers
of slum dwellers living close to small affluent urban elites is obvious.
Employment and livelihoods
Wage and salaried jobs, with legal contracts and a degree of job protection,
account for about 10 percent of employment among African men in the
formal public or private sector. Another 15 percent comprise wage jobs
in the less formal sector. These proportions are lower for women. The
bulk of work takes the form of self-employment, family employment, and
micro-enterprises in agriculture or other activities. Commerce, or petty
trading, accounts for 50–70 percent of non-agricultural activities, followed
by manufacturing, food, and other services, typically based at home or on
the street. A tiny minority evolve into larger enterprises but most are des-
tined to remain at a precarious and low-income level (World Bank 2012).
Unemployment is very low, simply because poor people cannot afford the
option of inactivity. However, underemployment is pervasive. The evidence
for Ethiopia is probably representative. Over one-quarter of rural residents
complained of under-employment and about 50 percent of employed urban
youth wished to work longer hours (Broussar and Tekleselassie 2012).
Within this context of an abundance of labor eking out precarious
livelihoods on family farms or small-scale trading, Africa faces further very
large increases in the adult population. The number of men and women
aged 20–64 years will grow 2.5-fold in the next 35 years, with an aver-
age annual increase of 19.5 million. The fact that the prime working-age
population will increase faster than the less productive age groups repre-
sents a small boost to GDP per head provided that productivity does not
decline (Eastwood and Lipton 2011). The fall in fertility and family size is
also an advantage because families with many dependents are more likely
than others to slip into poverty and less likely to escape. The clear danger,
however, is that the large increase in the labor force will simply swell the
ranks of the self-employed with precarious livelihoods on farms and in petty
trading.
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Most African countries today are primarily agrarian in terms of em-
ployment but are rapidly urbanizing. According to Paul Collier, “Job gen-
erating industrialization has, up to now, been the only way out of national
poverty” (2015, p. 39). If Collier is right, Africa’s future depends to a large
extent on the creation of jobs in labor-intensive manufacturing. By com-
parison, extractive industries, responsible for much of Africa’s impressive
GDP growth in recent years, generate few jobs and do not deliver inclusive
growth. Thus far, Asia has reaped the benefit of globalization, specifically
the movement of capital and dismantling of trade barriers, and become the
world’s factory. Africa’s record of growth in manufacturing is poor and its
share of global manufacturing has declined.
Can Africa gradually replace Asia as the world’s center for labor-
intensive, semi-skilled manufacturing? Africa’s rapidly growing labor force
is sometimes seen as a big advantage when set against declining labor
forces in China and elsewhere. However, the population aged 15–64 years
in Africa’s competitors in Southern Asia and the low-wage economies of
South-East Asia (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) will continue
to grow, from 1.3 billion in 2015 to 1.7 billion in mid-century (UN Popula-
tion Division 2015). Global trends in the number of manufacturing jobs are
disputed. The World Bank (2012) estimated a fluctuating total of 160–200
million such jobs between 1990 and 2008, with a modest underlying up-
ward trend, and envisages future stability or even decline, largely because
of productivity gains. By incorporating rough estimates of manufacturing in
the informal economy, UNIDO (2013) concluded that the number of peo-
ple involved in manufacturing rose from 300 million to nearly 400 million
over the same time period. To the extent that the World Bank’s progno-
sis is correct, Africa’s growth in the working-age population is not a great
advantage.
The answer to the question posed in the preceding paragraph depends
onmany factors. One analysis comparedmanufacturing firms in Africa with
firms in other low-income countries and concluded that the poor perfor-
mance in Africa could be largely attributed to inadequate infrastructure and
lack of access to finance, factors that could be rectified in a reasonable time
span (Harrison, Lin, and Xu 2014). Below we consider other factors, the
most important of which are relative wage costs, productivity, skills of the
working population, financial capital formation, and institutional capital,
including political stability.
Relative wage costs versus productivity and cost of
raw materials
Lack of reliable data precludes comparisons of African wage and non-wage
costs of labor in manufacturing to the costs elsewhere. However, a detailed
comparison of Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Zambia with China and Vietnam
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is revealing. Wages for skilled and unskilled workers in China, averaged
across six light manufacturing sectors, are higher than in the other coun-
tries (Dinh et al. 2012). This differential reflects the trebling of real wages in
East Asia between 2000 and 2011, compared with an 18 percent growth in
Africa (ILO 2014). However, Vietnam and Tanzania had similar wage lev-
els while Zambia’s wages were higher than Vietnam’s. Only Ethiopia had a
large cost advantage compared with Vietnam. One cannot assume that most
African countries enjoy a wage-cost advantage over future competitors that,
in addition to Vietnam, will include Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Cambo-
dia. Moreover, any wage-cost advantage disappears when productivity and
the cost of raw materials are taken into account. In furniture production,
for instance, Chinese workers produce 4.5 chairs per day, Vietnamese 1.9,
and Ethiopians 0.3 (Dinh et al. 2012). In addition, the costs of most raw
materials, such as timber, steel, and cotton, are higher in Africa than in
East Asia, mainly because of poorly developed primary industries and high
import tariffs.
Labor force skills
The skills and productivity of the labor force are probably more important
for industrial development than wage levels. Cognitive skills in literacy,
mathematics, and problem solving are an indispensable foundation, learned
in formal schooling. According to the central education projections pro-
duced by the Wittgenstein Centre, the proportion of the adult population in
Africa with at least some secondary or higher schooling will roughly double
between 2015 and 2050, except in Southern Africa where this fraction
is already high (www.wittgensteincentre.org/dataexplorer). As shown in
Figure 6, two-thirds of adults in Middle and Western Africa, 90 percent in
Southern Africa, and 45 percent in Eastern Africa are projected to have
reached secondary school or higher by mid-century. This bodes well for hu-
man capital. However, as mentioned earlier, number of years in school does
not necessarily translate into cognitive attainment, and African educational
systems have been criticized for neglect of vocational and technical training
that is needed for the expansion of manufacturing (ILO 2009, 2012).
Capital formation and investment
Industrialization and the modernization of agriculture require capital,
for which there are three main sources: domestic savings, foreign direct
investment (FDI), and remittances. Increased domestic savings, whether
achieved by declines in dependency ratios or not, has been an important
contributor to accelerated economic growth in Asia. As shown in Figure
7, Africa’s net savings expressed as a percent of gross national income fell
between the late 1970s and the late 1990s but has risen sharply in the
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FIGURE 6 Percent of population with some secondary or higher
education, both sexes, sub-Saharan Africa, 2010–2050
past decade. Nevertheless, it is below the levels recorded in South Asia
and well below the East Asian level, though not much different from Latin
America. High transaction costs and an inefficient banking system may
have been responsible for the historically low savings levels in Africa. These
conditions are improving and it appears that savings are responding to a
more conducive environment.
Net FDI trends for countries in Africa are also encouraging, showing a
17-fold increase from about US$2,206 million per year in the early 1990s
to $36,700 million for 2010–2013. However, the developing countries in
East Asia and the Pacific, and to a lesser extent Latin America, still capture
the lion’s share of net inward investment (Figure 8). Moreover, much recent
FDI in Africa has been directed toward extractive industries with little effect
on job creation.
Remittances to Africa are relatively small, estimated to comprise only
4 percent of all remittances to developing countries (Gupta, Pattillo, and
Wagh 2009). Inmost countries, they amounted to 3 percent or less of GDP in
2000–6, the main exceptions being Lesotho, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Togo,
and Senegal.
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FIGURE 7 Net national savings as percent of gross national income,
1975–2013
Despite positive trends in domestic savings and FDI, Africa is not in-
vesting the 25 percent of GDP thought to be necessary to sustain an eco-
nomic growth rate of 7 percent. Specifically, investment (gross fixed capital
formation) in Africa (including North Africa) was 17.7 percent of GDP in
the period 1990–1999, rising slightly to 18.7 percent in 2000–2011 (UNC-
TAD 2014). The average for all developing countries for the more recent
period was 26 percent.
Institutional capital
A skilled labor force and adequate financial capital will fail to lead to im-
proved employment in the absence of institutional capital. This term covers
a broad range of components including political stability with the prospect of
peaceful transitions of power; appropriate economic policies; a reasonably
efficient state bureaucracy; and effective financial and legal systems. One
analysis concluded that Africa’s poor economic performance was mainly
due to low institutional quality, including lack of trade openness (Sachs
and Warner 1997). The presence of political leaders who are genuinely
JOHN CLELAND / KAZUYO MACH IYAMA 19
FIGURE 8 Foreign direct investment, net inflows (current
US$), 1970–2000
committed to improving the welfare of the population at large rather than
serving the interests of small elites is of paramount importance, though im-
possible to quantify. The exceptional recent economic performance, includ-
ing job creation, of Ethiopia and Rwanda supports the Sachs–Warner con-
clusion. Both countries are landlocked and lack mineral resources yet have
recorded rapid improvements under regimes that are clearly determined to
improve general living standards.
By general consent, policy frameworks have improved greatly in the
past decade or so, symbolized by the endorsement by heads of states of a
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the Africa Union’s
Agenda 2063. But huge problems remain. The international assessment
of the legitimacy and effectiveness of national governments classifies 22
African countries as being among the world’s 28 highly fragile states
(Marshall and Cole 2014). Similarly, the World Bank’s assessment of
business environments ranks 12 African countries, including two of the
most populous (Nigeria and DR Congo), as among the worst-performing
10 percent of 189 countries (World Bank 2015). Of the mainland states
only South Africa, Rwanda, Ghana, Botswana, and Namibia appear in the
higher-performing 50 percent.
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Diverse socioeconomic pathways and
population mobility
The socioeconomic pathways of African countries are diverging. Con-
sider the progress of Ghana and the regress of the Central African
Republic. Divergence will undoubtedly continue. Some countries will
graduate from least-developed tomiddle-income status. Others will be over-
whelmed by rapid population increase and may face a Malthusian fu-
ture where populations cannot be sustained. Yet others may be trapped
in continuing poverty and hunger by inept governments and civil strife,
a scenario exacerbated by population growth but not necessarily caused by
it.
Of the group of problem countries, those in the Sahel figure promi-
nently. The combined populations of Chad, Mali, and Niger are pro-
jected by the United Nations Population Division to grow from around
50 million in 2015 to close to 150 million by mid-century. All three coun-
tries have fragile governments and problems of internal security, face peri-
odic food shortages, and are extremely vulnerable to climate change (Potts,
Henderson, and Campbell 2013). It is improbable that agricultural produc-
tion will be able to keep pace with population increase or that exports will
be sufficient to fund massive imports of food. International assistance will
be unable to cope with such vast numbers in need. If this prognosis is valid,
the predictable response will be emigration. A small number of individuals
will have the means to emigrate to Europe, but the majority will cross
adjacent borders, to Nigeria for instance.
A likely, but rarely discussed trend in Africa between now and mid-
century is increased intra-regional movement, involving not thousands but
possiblymillions. A key question is whether cross-bordermigrationwill pro-
voke violence. When a common culture and language unite both migrants
and the host community, as with Fulani speakers in Northern Nigeria and
adjacent countries, the prospects are good; when this source of cohesion
and solidarity is lacking, they are potentially alarming.
Concluding comments
Because the fertility decline in Africa has been so slow, the dominant de-
mographic force for the next 35 years will be continued growth in num-
bers of births, young children, the school-age population, and adults. To be
sure, growth of the adult population will outstrip that of the younger age
groups. This change in age structure is a positive development but the de-
mographic signal is too weak to be a decisive influence on socioeconomic
progress.
We have outlined the implications of continued population growth for
pressure on health and education services; the need to feed a population
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that will double in size; the danger that rapid urbanization will outstrip
efforts to improve living conditions; the challenges of employment and
productivity for an adult population that will be 2.5 times larger in 2050
than today; and the prospect of mass migration within the region due to
Malthusian factors or chronic failure of some countries. None of these
implications represents insuperable barriers to progress but, considered
together, they underscore the magnitude of the task ahead. Success will
depend above all on political will and sound governance. The examples of
Ethiopia and Rwanda have shown what can be achieved by effective, albeit
somewhat despotic, governments in raising welfare and reducing poverty.
Improving agricultural production is perhaps the most tractable chal-
lenge. Yields are so low in much of Africa that the investment in infrastruc-
ture and technology should pay high dividends. Demand from an increas-
ing urban population will help, at least for farmers with access to markets
in towns and cities. A concern is further fragmentation of farm sizes at-
tributable to population increase, but the main threat is climate change.
Most farmers will remain extremely vulnerable to erratic rainfall, and, in
the longer term, temperature rises could spell disaster.
The least tractable challenge concerns employment and livelihoods.
The impressive economic growth of the past decade has not been driven
by any significant increase in manufacturing. Instead, the growing labor
force has been absorbed into farming and the service sector, predominantly
in the form of household enterprises. The structure of African economies
has hardly changed since 1980, and manufacturing has declined as a per-
cent of GDP since the 1990s. It is doubtful whether most African countries
can maintain progress in the long term without a rapidly growing indus-
trial base, of which there is yet little sign. The global number of formal-
sector jobs in manufacturing is not growing rapidly, so the mere increase
of Africa’s labor force by itself is not an advantage. Africa will have to com-
petewith other low-wage regions and countries for international capital and
expertise. Success will have to be hard won.
It is probable that some countries will have a bright future but that
other, mainly landlocked states will remain mired in poverty and hunger
as a result of Malthusian factors or poor governance. Anticipation of mass
migration within the next 35 years is justified, and whether this can occur
without civil strife is one of the big uncertainties for the region.
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